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Abstract
We study the co-evolution of social participation and social capital
accumulation, taking the view that the former contributes to the lat-
ter, and both contribute to the enjoyment of ‘relational goods’. Within
this framework, we show that a process of substitution of private for
social activities (observable in some advanced, aﬄuent economies),
might be self-reinforcing and lead to a Pareto-dominated steady state.
We ﬁnd some scope for policy intervention, but we also acknowledge
its diﬃculty.
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11 Introduction
It is intuitively clear, and well acknowledged by social psychologists [see e.g.
Moscovici (1993)], that individual well-being depends crucially on social re-
lations. In contrast, most economic models let it just depend on private
consumption, or at at most consumption and leisure, typically both inter-
preted as private goods [see Postlewaite (1998) for a discussion]. In this
paper we take the view that socially enjoyed leisure is crucial for well-being,
but leaves individuals highly exposed to the external eﬀects of other people’s
behavior1. In a poor social environment, therefore, there is an incentive to
shift away from low-rewarding social activities and to invest more time in
private ones. If such activities yield goods that enter in GDP records, while
socially enjoyed leisure mostly does not, this substitution process may be
an engine of economic growth, but at the same time it may lead to social
impoverishment. We investigate this mechanism in the context of a dynamic
model that studies the co-evolution of social participation and of social cap-
ital accumulation.
The economic literature on social capital (deﬁned by Narayan (1999) as
“the norms and social relations embedded in the social structures of soci-
eties that enable people to coordinate action to achieve desired goals”) has
provided abundant evidence of two facts: a positive relationship between
some forms of social capital and growth, and a recent impoverishment in
some countries’ stock of social capital2; moreover, it has provided a few
models explaining certain features of social capital accumulation. For in-
stance, DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) show theoretically and empirically
that homeowners invest more than renters both in social connections and in
local amenities; Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote (2002) argue that individuals
invest in social skills in the same way as they do in human capital; Alesina
and La Ferrara (2000) ﬁnd theoretically and empirically that social partic-
ipation is higher where income inequality, ‘racial’ segmentation and ethnic
1We prefer to speak of well-being rather than of welfare precisely because we want to
focus on its ‘social aspects’.
2See Sobel (2002) for a critical discussion of this literature and Coleman (1988, 1990) for
seminal work. The World Bank (2004) has an excellent electronic library on the subject.
Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zack and Knack (2001) present some of the most relevant
empirical ﬁndings about the relationship between social capital and growth. Putnam
(2000) documents in detail the rise and decline of U.S. social capital over the XX century;
among others, Costa and Kahn (2003) discuss the causes of this phenomenon.
2segmentation are lower; Routledge and von Amsberg (2003) argue that tech-
nological change may increase labor mobility and therefore decrease social
capital.
There are a number of features that we add to this literature. First, if the
positive link between social capital and growth makes people worry about
the possible consequences of social impoverishment, we take a stronger po-
sition: even if the decline in social capital were matched by higher (rather
than lower) growth, or even if it were itself an engine of growth, its overall
well-being consequences might be negative; moreover, we ﬁnd that a problem
of social poverty may emerge in an economy in which individuals are iden-
tical in terms of preferences, technology and endowments, so that Alesina
and La Ferrara’s (2000) ﬁndings imply that the same problem will be even
more serious in highly segmented or unequal societies. Second, we advance
the existing literature by explicitly studying the bi-directional link between
social participation and social capital accumulation. Third, unlike Glaeser,
Laibson and Sacerdote (2002), we do not conceive social capital as a private
asset, but rather as a ‘social’ asset, thus remaining close to Narayan’s (1999)
above quoted deﬁnition. While we share with Routledge and von Amsberg
(2003) this focus on the ‘social’ aspects of social capital3, we diﬀer from
them by emphasizing its ‘capital’ aspect as well and by explicitly modelling
its accumulation. Finally, while in a companion paper [Antoci, Sacco and
Vanin (2004)] we study growth and social capital accumulation within a neo-
classical framework, starting from the assumption that individuals are fully
rational, here we explore the idea that social dynamics may be the result of
boundedly rational behaviors (for instance, it may be driven to a large extent
by imitation of other people’s successful behavior).
The possibility that economic growth brings about the destruction of old
patterns of social relationships is an old concern in social sciences, dating
back at least to the observers of the eﬀects of the industrial revolution. Al-
though old, it remains extremely actual, since, as Hisch (1976) and Putnam
(2000), among others, well document, it may explain important trends of
contemporary economies. A new attention is now paid to the idea that this
same process may further stimulate economic growth, inducing a substitu-
tion of private for social activities. There is an environmental economics
literature that focuses on this mechanism: see, among others, Antoci and
Bartolini (1999 and 2004). While this literature mostly focuses on natural
3See also Bowles and Gintis (2002), and Schiﬀ (1992 and 2002).
3resources, our focus is rather on the social environment.
Our work is also related to Corneo’s (2001) ﬁnding that television watch-
ing and work hours are positively correlated across countries. He explains
this fact with a model of time allocation among labor, private leisure and
socially enjoyed leisure, with strategic complementarity in the latter and
therefore multiple equilibria. Our model is close to it because we focus on
a similar time allocation problem, with strategic complementarities in so-
cially enjoyed leisure4. In particular, we share his consideration that the
latter generates ‘relational goods’, a concept introduced by Uhlaner (1989)
and amounting to a special case of Cornes and Sandler’s (1984) joint pro-
duction model. Relational goods have the peculiar features that they cannot
be enjoyed alone and that their enjoyment depends on both own and other
people’s contribution, so that they are an intermediate case between private
and public goods. Examples include social approval, solidarity, friendship,
sharing life with another person and creating or reinforcing group identity or
the sense of aﬃliation to a group (possibly through identiﬁcation with social
or ethical norms). What we add to Corneo’s analysis is the consideration
that relational goods also depend on the social environment in which inter-
action takes place: at a given level of own and other people’s participation, it
makes a diﬀerent whether a history of high participation has generated high
trust, shared values and a large amount of opportunities for socially enjoyed
leisure, or whether the social environment is poor, so that the incentives for
social participation are low. In other words, we let relational goods depend
on social capital and we study how its accumulation inﬂuences the patterns
of time allocation between private and social activities5.
In this paper, we model social capital as an accumulated externality of
social participation that positively aﬀects the enjoyment of relational goods.
‘Investment’ in social capital takes the form of time investment in social ac-
tivities, which are pursued with the aim of enjoying relational goods6. As
4See Cooper and John (1988) for general results on strategic complementarities and
multiple equilibria, and Becker (1965) for seminal work on the economics of time allocation.
5In principle, relational goods could also depend upon participants’ and not partici-
pants’ identity, but we do not consider this issue because we assume identical individuals.
See Akerlof and Kranton (2000) for a deeper discussion about the economic relevance of
identity.
6The fact that consumption and investment are not opposed here should not surprise,
since it is a common feature of various forms of non material capital (e.g., the use of
knowledge increases its stock, rather than diminishing it). Such intuition goes back to the
Aristotelian analysis of ethical virtues, whose seeds are still to be found in Nussbaum’s
4discussed, among others, by Paldam and Svendsen (2000), there are several
alternative ways to think of social capital: other forms of social capital are
surely best modelled in a diﬀerent way, but we think that our formalization
captures concretely observable phenomena that are of crucial relevance for
well-being. There is one major aspect that we are neglecting and that de-
serves discussion: while we are restricting social capital accumulation and
enjoyment of relational goods to depend just on social interaction outside of
the market, it is clear that both of them may take place, to a certain extent,
also through market interaction. Therefore, although useful to make our
point clear, our formulation is extreme. Yet, we believe that it captures the
right sign, so that our qualitative results would still hold in a more general
setting, because the market is primarily private-oriented and does not foster
a collective orientation, which appears to be crucial for the accumulation of
many forms of social capital and for enjoyment of relational goods7. As a
ﬁnal observation, notice that we also neglect here for simplicity the role of
investment in any form of private capital; yet, our companion neoclassical
paper, which takes it into account, makes us conﬁdent that our results can
be generalized in this direction.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 displays
the basic features of the model. Section 3 introduces the evolution of social
participation taking the stock of social capital as given. Section 4 introduces
social capital accumulation. Section 5 discusses the model’s outcomes in
terms of well-being and growth. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We model an economy composed by a continuum (of measure 1) of identical
individuals (i.e., with identical preferences and technology), whose well-being
depends on three kinds of goods8: a private subsistence good (Y ), a relational
good (B) and a private good which is perfect substitute of the relational good
(1986) investigation of relational goods.
7On the relationship between market and non-market forms of interaction see, among
the many possible references, Polanyi (1977), Anderson (1990) and Sacco and Zamagni
(2001).
8In what follows we shall assume for simplicity that there are just three single goods,
but it would be easy to generalize to the case of three bundles of goods.
5(Ys)9. Every ‘day’ (we adopt a continuous speciﬁcation of ‘days’) individuals
choose how to allocate their time endowment (normalized to 1) between
production and consumption of private goods, on one side (fraction 1 − s
of their time), and socially enjoyed leisure, on the other side (fraction s).
Socially enjoyed leisure yields utility in the form of relational goods, but its
returns depend, besides on own choices, also on other people’s time allocation
and on the opportunities available in the social environment. In what follows
we speak indiﬀerently of socially enjoyed leisure and of social activities. For
simplicity, we assume that agents have to choose between the two following
pure strategies:
(R) a relational-oriented strategy, according to which they spend the fraction
sH ∈ (0,1) of their time in social activities;
(P) a private-oriented strategy, according to which they spend less time in
social activities, sL ∈ (0,sH), and more in production and consumption
of private goods.
We assume a very simple technology for private goods: the relational
strategy yields a ﬁxed quantity ¯ Y of private subsistence goods; the private
strategy yields, besides ¯ Y , also yields the ﬁxed amount ¯ Ys of those private
goods which are substitutes of relational goods. As far as relational goods
are concerned, identifying an individual with her chosen strategy, so that
i ∈ {R,P}, we assume the following technology:
Bi(Ks,x) = siR(Ks,x), (1)
where si = sL if i = P and si = sH if i = R; R(Ks,x) represents
the opportunities available in the social environment, which depend on the
level Ks of social capital and on the aggregate amount of time currently
devoted to social activities, which is [sHx + sL(1 − x)], where x ∈ [0,1] is
the fraction of individuals choosing the relational strategy10. Ks captures
the accumulated eﬀect of past social participation, whereas x measures its
present level. R(Ks,x) is speciﬁed as follows:
9The assumption that Ys is a perfect substitute for the relational good is rather op-
timistic [see Anderson (1990)]. By such assumption, the results about well-being in the
next section gain more relevance.
10Let us emphasize that x = 1 does not mean that individuals spend all of their time in
social activities, but rather that all of them spend relatively more time in these activities
and relatively less in private ones.




where β > 0 and γ ∈ (0,1) are parameters11. Notice that R(Ks,x) is an
increasing function of x. Notice as well that in our model the time not spent
in production and consumption of private goods is not itself a ﬁnal good, but
rather an intermediate good, whose value in terms of enjoyed relational goods
depends on average social participation and on available social opportunities.
Assuming that individual preferences are represented by the utility func-
tion U = lnY +ln(B+aYs), where a > 0 is the marginal rate of substitution
between B and Ys, the payoﬀs of the two strategies are the following: the
relational strategy yields
UR(Ks,x) = ln ¯ Y + ln[BR(Ks,x)] = (3)
= ln ¯ Y + ln[sHR(Ks,x)] =




and the private strategy yields12
UP(Ks,x) = ln ¯ Y + ln[BP(Ks,x) + a¯ Ys] = (4)
= ln ¯ Y + ln[sLR(Ks,x) + a¯ Ys] =
= ln ¯ Y + ln{sL[sHx + sL(1 − x)]
βK
γ
s + a¯ Ys}.
3 Evolution of social participation
We follow an evolutionary game approach and assume that the time deriva-
tive of x, ˙ x ≡ dx
dt, is given by the so called ‘replicator equation’ [see Weibull
(1995)]:
˙ x = x[UR(Ks,x) − ¯ U(Ks,x)], (5)
where ¯ U(Ks,x) is the average payoﬀ
11The assumption that γ < 1 rules out the possibility that the only two possible attrac-
tors of dynamics (13) introduced below are Ks = 0 and Ks = ∞. Indeed, our results can
be extended to the case of γ ≥ 1, although this is not very interesting. The extension is
anyway available from the authors upon request.
12Notice that strategy P reduces exposure to the negative externality of low R(Ks,x).
7¯ U(Ks,x) ≡ UR(Ks,x)x + UP(Ks,x)(1 − x). (6)
The choice of the replicator dynamics as social selection mechanism does
not imply a real loss of generality in a two-strategy setting like the one of
the present paper (although the dynamic interaction with social capital ac-
cumulation, discussed in the Section 6 below could, at least in principle). As
pointed out e.g. by Bj¨ ornerstedt and Weibull (1996), every payoﬀ-monotonic
selection dynamics can be represented in terms of the replicator dynamics
(by means of a suitable time and/or strategy dependent factor) and, more-
over, such dynamics is consistent with several realistic individual and social
learning mechanisms, such as simple forms of reinforcement of successful
own behaviors or imitation of observed successful behaviors of others [see
also B¨ orgers, Sarin (1997) and Schlag (1998) for deeper insights into the
behavioral microfoundations of the replicator dynamics].
Equation (5) may be rewritten as follows:
˙ x = x(1 − x)∆U(Ks,x), (7)
where ∆U(Ks,x) is the payoﬀ diﬀerential
∆U(Ks,x) ≡ UR(Ks,x) − UP(Ks,x) = (8)
= ln
sH[sL + (sH − sL)x]βKγ
s
sL[sL + (sH − sL)x]βK
γ
s + a¯ Ys
.
In general the evolution of social participation will depend on the dy-
namics of Ks, but for expositional purposes it is worthwhile to start with
a separate analysis of ˙ x when the stock of social capital is ﬁxed. Through-
out the rest of this section we treat consequently Ks as a strictly positive























13It is immediate to notice that K1
s < K2















Proposition 1 Dynamics (7) can be classiﬁed as follows:
• If Ks ≤ K1
s, then, for every initial value x(0) 6= 1, the strategy adoption
process converges to the ﬁxed point x = 0, in which all individuals follow
strategy P (see ﬁgure 1.a).
• If Ks ≥ K2
s, then, for every x(0) 6= 0, it converges to the ﬁxed point
x = 1 (see ﬁgure 1.b).
• If K1
s < Ks < K2
s, then both ﬁxed points x = 0 and x = 1 are locally
attracting and their attraction basins are separated by the repulsive ﬁxed
point ¯ x ∈ (0,1) (see ﬁgure 1.c).
Proof Notice ﬁrst that ˙ x = 0 ⇐⇒ {x = 0 ∨ x = 1 ∨ ∆U(x) = 0}.
Since
d∆U(x)
dx > 0 ∀x ∈ (0,1), this implies that x = 0 and x = 1 are the
only possible attractive ﬁxed points. Since ∆U(x) = 0 ⇐⇒ x = ¯ x and
sgn(˙ x) = sgn[∆U(x)], it follows that
¯ x ≥ 1 [i.e. ∆U(x) < 0 ∀x ∈ (0,1)] ⇐⇒ Ks ≤ K1
s;
¯ x ≤ 0 [i.e. ∆U(x) > 0 ∀x ∈ (0,1)] ⇐⇒ Ks ≥ K2
s;
¯ x ∈ (0,1) (i.e. ∃ interior repulsive ﬁxed point) ⇐⇒ K1




































Proposition 2 The ﬁxed point x = 1 Pareto-dominates the ﬁxed point x = 0
if and only if Ks > K3
s. When the interior ﬁxed point ¯ x exists, it Pareto-
dominates x = 0 and it is Pareto-dominated by x = 1.
14It is immediate to notice that K3
s < K1
s.
10Proof Notice that in x = 0, x = 1 and x = ¯ x each individual has the
same utility level ¯ U(x), [deﬁned in (6)], respectively equal to UP(0), UR(1),
and both UR(¯ x) and UP(¯ x). Now, Ks > K3
s just amounts to a re-writing of
UR(1) > UP(0). Recalling that UR(x), UP(x) and ¯ U(x) are all strictly in-
creasing in x, the last result, which means ¯ U(1) > ¯ U(¯ x) > ¯ U(0), immediately
follows. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 implies that if the ﬁxed point x = 1 is locally attractive,
it always Pareto-dominates the ﬁxed point x = 0, even when the latter
is locally attractive. Furthermore, even if x = 0 is the unique attracting
ﬁxed point, it may be Pareto-dominated by x = 1; in particular, this is the
case when K3
s < Ks ≤ K1
s. When the economy converges to x = 0, an
increasing proportion of individuals build their well-being on private rather
than on social sources; aggregate production and consumption of private
goods increases and so there is economic growth. Proposition 2 therefore
says that economic growth may lead to a low well-being trap. In such case,
it is the undesirable eﬀect of a coordination failure.
4 Social capital accumulation
In the above section, social capital Ks has been taken as a parameter; we
have seen that such parameter plays a key role in determining the relative
performance of strategies R and P and the well-being properties of attracting
ﬁxed points under dynamics (7). However, the assumption of stationarity of
Ks is restrictive; therefore, in this section we augment dynamics (7) by an
equation describing social capital accumulation:
˙ Ks = BR(Ks,x)x + BP(Ks,x)(1 − x) − δKs = (13)
= [sHx + sL(1 − x)]R(Ks,x) − δKs,
where δ > 0 is the depreciation rate of Ks. Equation (13) assumes that
social capital increases when available social opportunities are eﬀectively ex-
ploited, i.e., individuals devote time to social activities and enjoy relational
goods. We are closer here to an interpretation of social capital in terms of
evolution of customs and of social norms rather then in terms of construction
of associations and other social organization; however, these are just two as-
pects of a same process, so that our assumption does not appear to be very
11restrictive; moreover, a ‘learning-by-doing’ mechanism as the one formalized
by equation (13) seems relevant for both forms of social capital. By plugging
(2) into (13) we obtain
˙ Ks = Ks{[sL + (sH − sL)x]
1+βK
γ−1
s − δ}. (14)
We analyze dynamics (7), (14) in the region of the plane (Ks,x) in which























Proposition 3 Dynamics (7), (14) has two possible asymptotic attractors,
(KL
s ,0) and (KH
s ,1). If KL
s > K2





s, both of them; if KH
s < K1
s, only the former one. Along the
trajectories leading to (KL
s ,0), the economy experiences private growth at
the expenses of social participation and ends up in a state of social poverty;
along the paths towards (KH
s ,1), expansion of social participation leads to
social prosperity, but at the expenses of private growth.
Proof See Appendix.
Figures 2a, 2b and 2c give a graphical representation of the possible
dynamics15.
15In the ﬁgures, sinks are represented by full dots •, sources by open dots ◦ and saddle












































































  5 Well-being and social poverty traps
We next consider the well-being properties of the two asymptotic attractors
(KL
s ,0) and (KH
s ,1) and of the other ﬁxed points of dynamics (7), (14).
Proposition 4 When both attractors are present, (KH
s ,1) always Pareto-
dominates (KL
s ,0). More generally, whenever it is an attractor, (KH
s ,1)
Pareto-dominates every other ﬁxed point. When (KL
s ,0) is the only attractor,
it may be Pareto-dominated by some other ﬁxed point: in particular, KH
s >
K3
s is a suﬃcient condition for (KL
s ,0) to be Pareto-dominated by (KH
s ,1).
Proof We work out the proof only for the ﬁrst sentence of Proposition 4.
Since the proof of the other results works exactly the same way, we omit it.
Recall from Proposition 2 that, given Ks, ¯ U(Ks,1) > ¯ U(Ks,0) ⇔ Ks > K3
s.
Given x, ¯ U(Ks,x) is a strictly increasing function of Ks. When both at-
tractors are present, we have that K3
s < K1
s < KH
s , so that ¯ U(KH
s ,1) >
¯ U(KH
s ,0) > ¯ U(KL
s ,0). Q.E.D.
As already mentioned, in (KL
s ,0) the economy reaches the highest level of
expansion of private wealth at the expenses of social participation. Along the
14trajectories leading the economy to such traps we observe economic growth
driven by the destruction of social opportunities and by their replacement
with private goods.
The above considerations do not however imply that it is always ‘optimal’
for individuals to coordinate their choices on the strategy R. The problem is
analogous to that of interpreting Solow’s Golden Rule as a normative device.
To consider it, we have to study how individuals could rationally deviate from
the dynamics assumed in the replicator equation (5).
Proposition 5 Let K0
s > 0 be the initial endowment of social capital in the
economy and suppose that all individuals coordinate on strategy R.
• If K0
s > K3
s, strategy R is individually ‘optimal’ both in transition and
in the steady state (KH
s ,1). Therefore, social poverty traps may be
interpreted as a result of coordination failure.
• If K0
s < K3
s, strategy R is individually ‘optimal’ only if agents are
patient enough (or enough altruistic towards future generations), and
social poverty traps may be interpreted as the combined result of coor-
dination failure and of impatience (or lack of altruism towards future
generations).
Proof Just observe that when K0
s > 0, any strategy passing through (K0
s,1)
converges to (KH
s ,1) (the case of K0
s = 0 is trivial). Then the results of
Proposition 5 follow from Proposition 2. Q.E.D.
Although Proposition 5 points at a coordination failure problem16, clear-
cut policy conclusion are hard to draw, especially because the present model
is concerned with social capital provided by the civil society rather than by
the government17. Nevertheless, there may be some scope for policy because
the government could provide a set of rights, laws, incentives and services,
that help individuals to coordinate eﬃciently. In general, government and
civil society may be seen as complementary in generating the conditions for
social capital accumulation, but, as argued by Narayan (1999), if either of
them does not work properly, the other one may play, to a certain extent,
a substitutive role. Examples of possible interventions, frequent in the lit-
erature, are promotion of association rights, improvement of communication
16See Cooper and John (1988).
17Collier (1998) appropriately distinguishes between these two sources of social capital.
15systems and infrastructures, facilitating ‘cross-cutting ties’ among diﬀerent
social groups (for instance through school assignment regulation), and labor
time regulation. What the state cannot do, and in this we share Paldam
and Svendsen’s (2000) conclusion, is to enforce social capital top-down, since
the latter emerges essentially out of a self-enforcing process, that can be
stimulated with adequate incentives, but not substituted for.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper develops a dynamic model of the co-evolution of social partic-
ipation and social capital accumulation, to study the mechanism through
which individuals in a growing economy may be led to substitute private for
social activities, thus inducing a social impoverishment which reinforces the
same mechanism. While previous research ﬁnds that a decline in an econ-
omy’s stock of social capital may decrease its growth, we emphasize that,
even under the optimistic hypothesis that it stimulates growth, it may nev-
ertheless have negative consequences for well-being. In particular, we ﬁnd
that the economy may converge either to a steady state characterized by a
high level of private activities and by a low level of social capital and social
participation, or to one characterized by the opposite features. When both
outcomes are possible, the former is Pareto-dominated by the latter. The ac-
tual patterns of convergence will then display path dependence. Taking into
account that convergence to a ‘social poverty trap’ may be due to both co-
ordination failure and to impatience, we acknowledge the diﬃculty of policy
intervention, but at the same time we ﬁnd some scope for it.
There are several ways in which the hypotheses we make may be relaxed.
First, allowing for population heterogeneity would make social participation
more diﬃcult and thus would reinforce our results. Second, while it is not
clear that social participation increases productivity in the private sector,
other forms of social capital (namely generalized trust and trustworthiness)
certainly do18; at the same time, social interaction within the market may
be itself a source of social capital and of relational goods. The ﬁrst aspect
renders the problem of under-investment in social activities more serious;
the second one less serious. Overall, it is hard to see how our results would
change. Third, in our neoclassical companion paper we show that our results
18See Knack and Keefer (1997), Zak and Knack (2001) and Knack (2003).
16do not depend on two speciﬁc hypothesis we make in the present context:
the absence of private capital and the bounded rationality of our agents.
Appendix
Let us start with the locus ˙ Ks = 0: this holds if either Ks = 0 or if
[sL + (sH − sL)x]1+βKγ−1
s = δ. (17)
Equation (17) deﬁnes a function
Ks = ˆ Ks(x) ≡
(




which is strictly increasing in x and such that ˙ Ks > 0 below its graph and
˙ Ks < 0 above it, with ˆ Ks(0) = KL
s and ˆ Ks(1) = KH
s , as speciﬁed in (15) and (16).
Let us now consider the locus ˙ x = 0. As discussed in Section 5, ˙ x = 0 ⇐⇒
{x = 0 ∨ x = 1 ∨ ∆U(Ks,x) = 0} and ∆U(Ks,x) = 0 ⇐⇒ x = ¯ x [see equation
(11)], but now, being Ks no more a ﬁxed parameter, (11) deﬁnes a function
Ks = ˜ Ks(x) ≡
(
a¯ Ys




which is strictly decreasing in x and such that ˙ x < 0 below its graph and ˙ x > 0
above it, with ˜ Ks(1) = K1
s and ˜ Ks(0) = K2
s, as speciﬁed in (9) and (10).
Notice that the points (Ks,x) ∈ {(0,0),(0,1),(KL
s ,0),(KH
s ,1)} are ﬁxed points
of dynamics (7), (14). In each of them there is no coexistence of the two strategies.
The existence of an ‘interior’ ﬁxed point (i.e. a ﬁxed point where Ks > 0 and
0 < x < 1) depends on the shape of the graphs of ˜ Ks(x) and ˆ Ks(x). It is easy





dx . Therefore, there exists at most one interior
ﬁxed point and, when existing, it is always a hyperbolic saddle19. There are
therefore three possible cases:
• For KL
s > K2
s, the interior saddle does not exist, both (0,0) and (KL
s ,0)
are saddle points, (0,1) is a source and (KH
s ,1) is a sink. Almost all the





dx implies that the determinant of the jacobian matrix
evaluated at the interior ﬁxed point is strictly negative; consequently, the associated eigen-
values are both diﬀerent from zero (i.e. the ﬁxed point is hyperbolic) and have opposite





s, there exists the interior saddle, (0,0) is a
saddle, (0,1) is a source, both (KL
s ,0) and (KH
s ,1) are sinks. The stable
manifold of the interior saddle separates the attraction basins of the two
sinks (see ﬁgure 2.b).
• For KH
s < K1
s, the interior saddle does not exist, both (0,0) and (KH
s ,1) are
saddles, (0,1) is a source and (KL
s ,0) is a sink. Almost all the trajectories
approach the sink (see ﬁgure 2.c).
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